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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DALE J. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
GENERAL ELECTRIC and/or 
ELECTRIC MUTUAL LIABILITY, and 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS GENERAL ELECTRIC 
AND ELECTRIC MUTUAL LIABILITY 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly concluded, 
as a factual matter, that the medical panel was properly con-
stituted and fully qualified to render a medical decision in 
this case? 
II. Whether this Court should give deference to the 
Industrial Commission's factual determination that Nielson's 
current disability was not medically caused by any industrial 
accident? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CASE AUTHORITY 
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 
(Supp. 1988). The determinative case authorities are Rekward 
Case No. 88-529CA 
(Argument Priority No. 6) 
v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988); and 
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaint iff/Appellant Dale Nielson ("Nielson") claims 
Workers1 Compensation benefits for an osteomyelitis/discitis 
condition in his back treated in June, 1983, alleging that such 
condition was caused by an industrial injury to his leg which 
occurred nearly fourteen months earlier on April 26, 1982. (R. 
at 4.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the 
Industrial Commission. 
1. On September 12, 1983, Nielson made application for 
workers1 compensation benefits for his osteomyelitis/discitis 
condition. (R. at 4.) 
2. A hearing on Nielson's claim was conducted before 
Administrative Law Judge Janet L. Moffit on December 18, 1984. 
(R. at 16.) 
3. Following the Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge 
referred the matter to a Medical Panel consisting of: (1) an 
orthopedic surgeon; (2) a neurologist; and (3) an internist. 
(R. at 114-15.) 
4. The medical panel thoroughly reviewed an "extremely 
large" medical file and conducted extensive research into 
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Nielson's medical background and treatment history, including 
additional consideration of (1) Nielson's own expert's opin-
ions; and (2) substantial consultations with other physicians 
knowledgeable about the subject cervical spine condition at 
issue. (R. at 123-124, 346, 349-351 and 352.) 
5. The medical panel determined that there is no medi-
cally demonstrable causal connection between the problems 
complained of and the industrial accident which occurred on 
April 26, 1982. (R. at 366.) 
6. On April 15, 1988, based upon her review of evidence 
and the Medical Panel Report, Administrative Law Judge, 
Janet L. Moffit entered her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order, concluding that Nielson "failed to sustain his 
burden of proving a causal relationship between his industrial 
accident of April 26, 1982, and the medical conditions he later 
developed and identified as osteomyelitis and discitis in 
1983." (R. at 379.) 
7. On April 30, 1988, Nielson petitioned the Industrial 
Commission of Utah ("Commission") to review the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order, contending, for the first 
time, that the medical panel was not properly constituted. 
(R. at 381-387.) 
8. On August 30, 1988, the Commission entered its Order 
denying Nielson's Motion for Review concluding that it could 
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find Mno evidence supportive of Nielson's allegations that the 
medical panel in this case was not qualified to render a 
decision." (R. at 410.) 
9. Nielson petitions this Court for Review of the 
Commission's Final Order. (R. at 412-15.) 
C. Statement of Facts; 
The Statement of Facts contained in Nielson's brief goes 
beyond the Record and reasonable inferences which might be made 
therefrom. Therefore, respondents offer the following facts to 
accurately present and clarify the Record. 
1. While working on a generator on April 26, 1982, Nielson 
fell over a guard rail and sustained contusions and cuts on his 
legs. (R. at 77.) Nielson received medical treatment follow-
ing the accident. (R. at 77.) 
2. Nielson continued working after his accident. (R. at 
103-104.) 
3. Between May 30 and June 3, 1982, Nielson was hospital-
ized for a bleeding ulcer. (R. at 81.) During Nielson's 
hospitalization, it was discovered that one of his legs was 
infected with staphylococci bacteria ("staph"). Nielson was 
given appropriate antibiotic treatment. (R. at 81-82 and 
376.) Shortly thereafter, the leg healed completely. (R. at 
377. ) 
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4. On August 11, 1982, Nielson was treated for pneumonia, 
a serious upper respiratory infection and inflammation, and was 
again placed on antibiotics. (R. at 109 and 377.) Nielsen was 
again treated for a fairly chronic bronchitis beginning in 
August, 1982 for which he was treated on various occasions with 
antibiotics through December, 1982. (R. at 160-164.) 
5. In September, 1982, Nielson again suffered medical 
problems associated with rectal bleeding and gastric pain and 
was hospitalized on September 21, 1982. (R. at 355 and 377.) 
6. On December 11, 1982 Nielson had an infected ingrown 
toenail excised. (R. at 355 and 377.) 
7. Nielson did not miss work until February, 1983, when 
he testified he suffered pain in his right shoulder and neck. 
(R. at 106.) 
8. Relevant medical records indicate that Nielson first 
experienced pain in his shoulder and neck while attending a ball 
game in February of 1983. (R. at 106.) 
9. Nielson did not remember telling any of his physicians 
Dr. King, Dr. Sanders or Dr. Lamb that he had suffered any pain 
in his shoulder or neck for any period of time prior to February 
of 1983. (R. at 106-107.) 
10. Dr. Dean Black's medical notes indicate that Nielson's 
pain "started on 2/4/83," when he attended a baseball game. 
(R. at. 84 and 358.) Dr. John Sanders, a neurosurgeon, noted: 
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"no prior history of injury to neck or prior arm problem and no 
recent cause explained." (R. at 356.) 
11. In February, 1983, Dr. King treated Nielson for 
shoulder and low back pain and Nielson was subsequently hospi-
talized. Dr. Sanders treated Nielson for the neck and shoulder 
pain and performed a cervical myelogram on February 14, 1983. 
(R. at 85, 356 and 377.) 
12. Nielson had a bone scan performed on February 18, 1983, 
which revealed problems in the lower cervical spine. During his 
hospitalization, Nielson was also treated by Dr. Thomas Houltz 
who made findings of possible disc herniation at the C5-C6 level 
and C-6-C7 levels. Nevertheless, Nielson was released from the 
hospital shortly thereafter. (R. at 356 and 377.) 
13. On or about May 13, 1983, the pain in the left side of 
Nielson's neck and shoulder had increased and he was again 
injected in the area and advised to take physical therapy, 
which proved ineffective. (R. at 356-357 and 377.) 
14. Nielson was referred to Dr. Satovick, a neurosurgeon 
approximately fourteen months after Nielson's industrial acci-
dent. Dr. Satovick repeated a CT scan on Nielson, which proved 
unsatisfactory. A third CT scan was performed on June 20, 1983, 
where destruction in the bone in the cervical area was noted. 
(R. at 31-32, 377.) 
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15. Nielson was then referred to Dr. Lamb, who admitted 
Nielson to St. Mark's Hospital and performed corrective surgery 
on June 27, 1983. (R. at 33, 397.) Dr. Lamb diagnosed 
Nielson's condition as discitis/osteomyelitis. (R. at 357.) 
16. Samples of tissue removed from the surgical site were 
sent to the lab for examination. No growth of any organisms 
was found in the tissue samples and the tissue samples did not 
culture. (R. at 34, 357 and 377.) 
17. Because of the negative culture, it was impossible to 
determine what particular organism was responsible for the 
discitis and subsequent osteomyelitis. (R. at 34, 377.) 
18. The medical notes of Dr. Lamb, Nielson*s treating 
physician, indicate that Dr. Lamb could not relate Nielson*s 
discitis and osteomyelitis to the leg injury suffered as a 
result of his industrial accident of April 26, 1982. (R. at 
188, 358 and 378.) 
19. Following the June, 1983 surgery, Nielson did not 
return to work but has received sickness and accident benefits 
from the employer as well as long-term disability insurance 
payments from a private policy and Social Security benefits. 
(R. at 103 and 378.) 
20. The independent medical panel assigned to this matter 
by the Administrative Law Judge consisting of an orthopedic 
surgeon, an internist and a neurologist unanimously determined 
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that there was no causal connection between the applicant's 
discitis and osteomyelitis condition and the earlier industrial 
accident. (R. at 366 and 378.) 
21. The following factual determinations were adopted and 
upheld by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission: 
(a) The three doctors of the medical panel have 
treated, at least, as many discitis/osteomyelitis cases and 
perhaps more than Dr. Burke and "are certainly well qualified 
to voice an opinion in this matter." (R. at 378.) All of the 
doctors who testified in this matter were well qualified and 
presented reasoned opinions. (R. at 379.) 
(b) Nielson's own expert, Dr. Burke, conceded that 
the medical panel was qualified to determine the medical causa-
tion issue before it and that the panel members have expertise 
in infection matters which they treat on a daily basis. (R. at 
242 and 409.) 
(c) Dr. Burke did not review the transcript and only 
spent approximately four hours in analysis. (R. at 378.) 
Dr. Burke did not have all the medical information before him 
as did the independent medical panel. (R. at 409.) 
(d) The medical panel chairman consulted with 
Dr. Burke in order to fully consider his opinions. The panel 
members, after consulting, determined to maintain their find-
ings of no medical causation. (R. at 378.) 
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(e) The medical panel was unbiased, whereas Dr. Burke 
had treated Nielson and may therefore be biased in his favor. 
(R. at 409.) 
(f) Dr. Burke admitted that bacteria can be in the 
blood stream normally without having been introduced through a 
wound or illness, and that sources of infection other than the 
staph in Nielson's leg could have caused Nielson's present 
condition. (R. at 378 and 409.) 
(g) There was nothing more than a possibility that 
Nielson's condition of osteomyelitis/discitis arose from a 
staph infection and Dr. Burke admitted that causation cannot be 
proven. (R. at 130 and 379.) 
(h) The medical panel conferred with outside physicians 
considered to be experts in the relevant fields of medicine, 
including an expert in infectious disease, all of whom uni-
formly agreed with the medical panel conclusion that there was 
no connection between Nielsen's industrial accident and the 
subsequent development of osteomyelitis/discitis. (R. at 
377-379 and 409.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Substantial evidence supports the factual conclusion of the 
Administrative Law Judge and Commission that the medical panel 
in the instant case was "well qualified to voice an opinion in 
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this matter." (R. at 378.) For this reason, the Commission was 
fully justified, after reviewing all the evidence, in adopting 
the findings of the medical panel rather than those of indepen-
dent physicians. 
Nielson has failed to sustain his burden of proving that 
the medical panel was unqualified or that further physician 
specialization was required under Utah law. In addition, sub-
stantial evidence supports the Commission conclusion that there 
was no connection between the accident which occurred in April 
1982 and the osteomyelitis/discitis which was found in Nielson's 
cervical spine some fourteen months later. 
When there are differing medical opinions presented in the 
record, as in the instant case, the Commission is not bound to 
accept the opinion of any particular witness, but has the pre-
rogative to "view the entire testimony of the medical panel 
doctor(s) and believe those statements that impress it." 
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986). See also 
Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 166, 167-69 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
By this appeal, Nielson attempts to discredit the opinion 
of the medical panel in the instant case, based upon his mere 
assertions that the independent medical panel was improperly 
constituted and that Dr. Burke was somehow better qualified than 
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the panel to make a medical judgment. However, Nielson's asser-
tions have neither legal support nor factual merit. On the 
contrary, the Record abundantly supports the conclusions of both 
the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission that Dr. Burke's 
opinion is only speculation and that there is no evidence that 
the medical panel was not fully qualified to render a medical 
opinion in this case. For these reasons, the Order of the 
Commission must be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS SHOULD 
NOT BE DISPLACED. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard of 
review for Industrial Commission cases in Blaine v. Industrial 
Commission, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1985), concluding that 
"the Commission's findings are not to be displaced in the 
absence of a showing that they are arbitrary and capricious." 
The Court clarified this standard of review in Rushton v. Gelco 
Express, 732 P.2d at 109 (Utah 1986), explaining that the find-
ings and orders of the Commission are not arbitrary and capri-
cious unless "they are contrary to the evidence or without any 
reasonable basis in the evidence." 
In Blaine, the Utah Supreme Court referred to the prior case 
of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1982), in 
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order to outline the Appellate Court's function in reviewing 
Industrial Commission findings: 
[I]t is apparent that this Court's function in re-
viewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly 
limited one in which the question is not whether the 
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether 
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious," 
or "wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one 
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence," or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
Kaiser Steel, 732 P.2d at 890. See also Lancaster v. Gilbert 
Development, 736 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah 1987). 
Accordingly, this Court "give[s] maximum deference to the 
basic facts determined by the agency, which will be sustained 
if there is evidence of any substance that can be reasonably 
regarded as supporting the determination made." Wilson v. 
Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah App. 1987) 
(citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d 
508-509 (Utah 1987)). In the instant case, the Commission and 
the Administrative Law Judge have both determined, as a factual 
matter, that the independent medical panel was not only 
properly constituted, but also "well qualified to voice an 
opinion in this matter." (R. at 378 and 409-410.) Substantial 
evidence supports this determination and the findings of the 
panel, as set forth in detail below. 
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POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLU-
DED THAT THE MEDICAL PANEL WAS QUALIFIED TO 
RENDER A MEDICAL DECISION IN THIS CASE. 
A. The Medical Panel Was Properly Constituted. 
Nielson urges this Court to overturn the Order of the Com-
mission based upon the argument that the medical panel lacked 
"requisite expertise." (Nielson's Brief at p. 7.) Nielson also 
contends that the opinions of his expert should have been con-
sidered and adopted to validate the medical panel. Nielson's 
arguments are both legally flawed and factually unsupported 
because: (1) The Commission selected qualified physicians to 
fill the panel; and (2) The Commission need not adopt the 
opinions of independent physicians. 
In Rushton v. Gelco Express, 739 P.2d 109, 110 (Utah 1986), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that "the Commission is not neces-
sarily bound to accept the opinions of any witness or witnesses, 
expert or otherwise." In Rushton, the plaintiff argued that 
the findings of the Commission were arbitrary and capricious 
because the Administrative Law Judge adopted the findings of the 
medical panel rather than those of plaintiff's treating physi-
cian. According to the plaintiff in Rushton, the Administrative 
Law Judge should have been required as a matter of law to give 
deference to the treating physician's findings. The Utah 
Supreme Court refused to adopt plaintiff's argument: 
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Decisions from this Court have repeatedly affirmed the 
fact-finding role of the Commission and have stated 
that the Commission must look at all relevant evidence 
in reaching its findings without being restricted to 
giving evidence from a specific witness more weight 
than that from other witnesses . . . the Commission is 
the principal fact-finder and as such may review all 
relevant evidence. 
Rushton, 732 P.2d at 110-111. 
Likewise, in Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 
237, 238 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that where 
there is competent and comprehensive medical evidence in the 
record upon which the Administrative Law Judge could rely he or 
she must make the factual determination: "although the medical 
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsibility of the 
Administrative Law Judge to resolve factual conflicts." 
(Emphasis added). 
Therefore, in deciding conflicting medical evidentiary 
issues, the Commission need not accept the opinions of any 
specific witness or witnesses. Shipley v. C&W Contracting Co., 
528 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1974). Rather, the Commission has both 
the "prerogative and the duty to view the entire testimony of 
the medical panel doctor[s] and believe those statements that 
impress it." Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 110 (Utah 
1986), (citing Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 
240, 398 P.2d 882, 885 (1965). After such review, the fact 
that the Commission adopts "the findings of the panel rather 
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than those of the independent physicians does not render the 
Commission's finding arbitrary and capricious." Rekward, 755 
P.2d at 168. 
In the instant case, Nielson, like the plaintiff in Rushton, 
attempts to improperly restrict the fact-finding role of the 
Commission by imposing his subjective standard of what con-
stitutes a valid medical panel upon the Commission and this 
Court. Thus, Nielson, in essence, asks this Court to oversee 
the Commission's selection of medical panel specialists any 
time the applicant is dissatisfied with Commission's choices or 
the independent medical panel's opinion. If this Court were to 
adopt the position advocated by Nielson, it would unduly narrow 
the evidence the Commission could rely upon and could increase 
the potential for bias in proceedings before the Commission. 
Nielson's position would also force improper judicial activism 
in an area properly overseen by the Commission. 
Rather than adopt Nielson's untenable position, respondents 
respectfully submit that the only issue for decision in the 
instant case is whether the Commission properly determined, as 
a factual matter, that the medical doctors constituting the 
panel were sufficiently qualified to render an opinion in this 
case. 
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Nielson's claim that the medical panel must include a 
doctor who is board certified in infectious diseases is not 
supported by the Record. Dr. Hess, the medical panel chairman, 
testified that he did not see a need for it (R. at 154.) and 
even Dr. Burke noted that the members of the medical panel have 
expertise in infectious diseases and in fact deal with them on 
a daily basis in treatment of patients. (R. at 242). Dr. Hess 
is a board certified orthopedic surgeon and, as such, has 
specifically dealt with and treated osteomyelitis/discitis on 
numerous occasions (R. at 154). In fact, he has addressed the 
particular ailment suffered by Nielson in greater depth and 
frequency than has Dr. Burke. Id. All of the members of the 
medical panel, as well as additional medical experts with whom 
the panel consulted, appear by the Record to have not only 
sufficient training, expertise and experience to have properly 
addressed the medical issue presented in this case but are also 
probably more qualified than Dr. Burke (R. at 139 and 201). 
Dr. Burke is not an orthopedic specialist, and Applicant's 
medical problem is specifically orthopedic in nature (R. at 
237). 
Dr. Burke admitted that orthopedics is one of the oldest 
medical specialties in existence while his own specialty of 
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infectious diseases is fairly new (R. at 208). He even con-
ceded: "Infectious diseases is a relatively new, young spe-
cialty/' and "I feel that I am a student of infectious disease 
more than an expert in infectious disease." (Id.) He admitted 
that the principal focus of his own training and practice has 
been infections of the urinary tract (R. at 238) and that he 
has never specifically studied or written on the subject of 
orthopedic problems as related to infectious diseases (R. at 
238). Moreover, his emphasis has been academic rather than 
private practice treatment. (R. at 209.) 
Based on this and other substantial evidence, the 
Administrative Law Judge concluded, as a factual matter, that: 
The three doctors of the medical panel have 
treated, at least, as many cases and perhaps more than 
[Nielson's expert] Dr. Burke and are certainly well 
qualified to voice an opinion in this matter. 
In trying to determine which viewpoint to adopt, 
the Administrative Law Judge notes that all of the 
doctors who testified in this matter were well quali-
fied and presented reasoned opinions. However, the 
Administrative Law Judge, after a careful review of 
the transcripts, is of the opinion that the report of 
the medical panel should be adopted in this matter. 
(R. at 378-379.) 
The Commission also concluded that the medical panel was 
properly constituted and fully qualified in the instant case: 
The Commission finds that the only issue on 
review is whether the Administrative Law Judge cor-
rectly adopted the medical panel report in this case. 
The Commission finds that on close questions of medical 
causation it is proper to defer to the finding of the 
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medical panel as the panels are setup specifically to 
resolve on an unbiased basis medical controversies 
arising in connection with industrial injuries. The 
Commission finds no specific evidence supportive of 
the applicant's allegations that the medical panel is 
not qualified to render a decision in this case. That 
being the only relevant objection made by counsel for 
the applicant, the Commission must deny the appli-
cant's Motion for Review and affirm the Administrative 
Law Judge. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. at 410.) 
Under these circumstances, Respondents respectfully urge 
this Court to uphold the factual determinations of the 
Commission by appropriately "giv[ing] maximum deference to the 
basic facts determined by the agency, which will be sustained 
if there is evidence of any substance that can be reasonably 
regarded as supporting the determination made." Wilson v. 
Industrial Commission, 375 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1987) 
(citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d 508, 
508-09 (Utah 1987)). 
B. Utah Legal Requirements for Medical Panel Members Were 
Satisfied in the Instant Case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 provides in pertinent part that: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury 
by accident, or for death, arising out of or in the 
course of employment, and if the employer or its insur-
ance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel 
appointed by the commission. The panel shall have the 
qualifications generally applicable to the medical 
panel under Section 35-2-56. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-56 states that: 
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Where a claim for compensation based upon partial per-
manent disability due to an occupational disease or 
industrial injury is filed with the commission, the 
commission shall appoint an impartial medical panel to 
consist of one or more physicians specializing in the 
treatment of the disease or condition involved in the 
claim • . • . 
In the instant case, Nielson contends that his subjective 
desire that the medical panel have a broad certified infectious 
disease specialist must be satisfied to comply with Utah law. 
However, the statute, at most, provides for a panel consisting 
of physicians "specializing in the treatment" of the condition 
involved in the claim. This statutory obligation has been 
fully satisfied in the instant case. 
First, the condition suffered by Nielson was not treated by 
an infectious disease expert but by physicians specializing in 
fields of specialty represented by the medical panel members. 
Second, the physicians on the panel and others who were con-
sulted had more than sufficient expertise to decide the medical 
issues in this case as it related to either orthopedics or 
infection. (R. at 139, 201 and 242.) See also Argument at 
Point II supra. Finally, the percentage of probability and 
causation argument urged by Nielson is unsupported and 
speculative. 
Nielson asserts that there was a "90 percent probability 
that the infection in the spine resulted from the industrial 
accident leg laceration. (Nielson Brief at pp. 11 and 16.) 
Nielson also contends that other sources of infection are "far 
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fetched" because "no culture or other medically demonstrable 
evidence was found that such an infection even existed." Id. 
at p. 15. These assertions are either completely unreliable or 
contradictory. 
The statement regarding a 90 percent probability was not 
any expression of medical certainty, but rather constitutes the 
mere belief of Dr. Burke, who acknowledges that a nexis between 
Nielson's accident and his present condition cannot be proven. 
(R. at 228 and 130.) Second, Dr. Burke's belief of a second 
incident of staph infection is based upon pure speculation 
because there was no culture of staph infection from the 
cervical spine operation. (R. at 34 and 377.) 
Accordingly, Dr. Burke's testimony regarding two incidents 
of staph infection is not factual, but based upon his own 
belief or speculation. There is no evidence that a staph 
infection even existed in the Nielson's cervical spine area. 
Thus, there is absolutely no evidence of connection between the 
leg wound and cervical spine damage in this case, and by 
Nielson's own logic, Dr. Burke's testimony is nothing but "far 
fetched." 
In reviewing Nielson's osteomyelitis/discitis condition and 
related claims for disability benefits, the medical panel noted 
that numerous physicians agreed with the panel determination 
that there is no medically demonstrable causal connection 
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between the problems presently complained of and Nielson's 
earlier industrial accident which occurred on April 26, 1982. 
(R. at 366-368.) 
The Administrative Law Judge in determining which viewpoint 
to adopt, noted that all of the doctors who testified in this 
matter were well qualified and presented reasoned opinions. 
(R. at 379.) After careful review of the transcripts, the 
Administrative Law Judge concluded as a factual matter that 
"there is nothing but a possibility that the osteomyelitis 
arose from a staph infection." (R. at 379.) 
Under circumstances in which there is only a "possibility 
of medical causation, as in the instant case, the Utah Supreme 
Court has forcefully stated: 
[W]e agree with plaintiff's urgence that a finding of 
fact and the imposition of liability cannot properly be 
made on a mere possibility, but that can be done only 
if there is a basis upon which reasonable minds acting 
fairly thereon could conclude that the greater proba-
bility of truth lies therein. Further, that in so dis-
charging its responsibility it was the prerogative and 
the duty of the Commission to consider not only the 
report of the medical panel, but also all of the other 
evidence and to draw whatever inferences and deductions 
fairly and reasonably could be derived therefrom. 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). 
Based on the foregoing and other medical evidence, the 
Administrative Law Judge made the following factual finding 
with respect to medical causation in this case: 
-21-
It is difficult to state that the leg wound some nine 
and a half months prior to the development of the 
actual disc problem is the most probable source, 
although possible. It is entirely too speculative to 
assign all of this gentleman's problem to the lacer-
ation resulting from the accident in April of 1982. 
It becomes a matter of possible cause versus probable 
cause. The proximity of the other sources of infec-
tion were much closer to the onset of the applicant's 
actual symptoms. Although not cultured, it was 
pointed out that the osteomyelitis can develop not 
only from staph infections but from other types of 
infection as well. 
(R. at 379.) 
Administrative Law Judge, Janet Moffet also determined that 
because the medical panel had been fully apprised of the medical 
information relating to Nielson's claims and his expert witness, 
Dr. Burke, this case involves the classic situation where rea-
sonable minds can and do differ. Judge Moffet carefully consi-
dered the evidence and opinions offered by Dr. Burke, particu-
larly his letter, dated February 6, 1986. Which specifically 
states that: 
I am in full agreement with all of the statements by 
Dr. Bohlman except for his conclusions that there is 
not a causal relation between the injury and the cer-
vical osteomyelitis in this case. . . . While I agree 
with him that there is no way one can prove a connec-
tion that long after the injury," I firmly believe 
that the evidence strongly supports such a connection. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. at 130.) From these statements, Judge Moffet found that 
even Dr. Burke felt that Nielson's disability could not be 
proven to have resulted from his previous industrial accident 
of April 26, 1982. (R. at 379.) 
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Although Dr. Burke speculated that "the occurrence of two 
staphylococcal infections in a patient in the same year itself 
speaks for a very direct connection in the prospective of our 
current understanding of staphylococcal disease." Dr. Burke 
acknowledged that other infections may have been responsible 
for the osteomyelitis/discitis condition and that there is no 
way to prove such connection. Because the Commission's find-
ings of fact cannot be based on mere speculation (IGA Food Fair 
v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978)), and the medical panel 
clearly concluded that no additional industrial disability had 
occurred, Judge Moffet properly determined that: 
The applicant in this matter, Dale Nielson, has failed 
to sustain his burden in proving a causal relationship 
between his industrial accident of April 26, 1982, and 
the injuries he sustained at that time and the develop-
ment of the osteomyelitis in the spring of 1983. 
(R. a 379.) 
In contrast to the speculative opinions of Dr. Burke, the 
medical panel unequivocally stated there is no medically 
demonstrable causal connection between the problems complained 
of and the industrial accident of April 26, 1982 and all of the 
residual problems complained of by the applicant were caused by 
pre-existing conditions or post-existing conditions. (R. at 
366.) 
In essence, Nielson simply argues each of the separate 
factors which he covered on cross-examination of the medical 
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panel chairman and asserts that his own analysis makes the 
causal connection between the accident and the cervical infec-
tion the "most possible" of several possibilities. However, 
this does not give rise to a "probability" and mere possibil-
ities cannot support a finding of causation. IGA Food Fair, 
584 P.2d at 830. 
Because of the limited and speculative nature of Dr. Burke's 
testimony and the direct position taken by numerous qualified 
medical experts, the Commission's decision, that any current 
disability suffered by Nielson did not result from the indus-
trial accident, is supported by substantial evidence and 
further satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-56. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION'S FINAL ORDER IS NOT ARBI-
TRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
A. The Record Amply Supports The Industrial Commission's 
Findings and Order. 
The thrust of Nielson's appeal is an attempt to impose a 
requirement upon this Court to oversee the selection and 
appointment of discretionary medical panels by the Commission. 
In other words, Nielson wants a "second bite out of the apple," 
despite the fact that there was a proper review of this matter 
by the full Commission which determined that (1) the medical 
panel was properly constituted and possessed requisite exper-
tise necessary to properly consider medical issues in the 
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instant case; (2) the medical evidence relied upon by the 
medical panel and the reasoning behind the medical panel's 
factual findings provide substantial support for the conclusion 
that Nielson's present ailments are not causally related to any 
industrial accident; and (3) the Record fully supports the deci-
sion of the Commission to uphold the findings of the medical 
panel and Administrative Law Judge. (R. at 408-410.) 
Although Nielson suffered an industrial accident in April, 
1982, the evidence amply demonstrates that his present discitus/ 
osteomyelitis disability is not a result of such accident. 
Nielson contends that the Commission erred by not appointing a 
medical panel with a board certified specialist in infectious 
disease to determine medical causation and then urges that his 
own expert's testimony is most reliable because of expertise in 
that field. 
This contention is, at best, contradictory because Nielson 
initially offered the testimony of Dr. Robert M. Satovick, a 
neurologist, to prove his medical causation theory. It was only 
after the medical panel, including a neurologist, Dr. Gerald 
Moress, concluded that there was no causal relationship between 
Nielson's industrial accident in 1982 and the discitis/ 
osteomyelitis discovered in 1983 that Nielson decided an infec-
tious disease expert was necessary to properly constitute the 
panel. (R. at 408-410.) 
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Nielson's contradiction is exacerbated by offering testimony 
of the neurologist, Dr. Satovick, where helpful, to support his 
factual contentions on appeal, even though Nielson offers his 
unsupported contention that the panel's neurologist, Dr. Moress, 
allegedly does not have sufficient expertise to render a medi-
cal decision in this case. (Nielson Brief at pp. 7-18.) 
In addition to the contradictions in Nielson's argument, 
the facts demonstrate that the medical panel was substantially 
better informed than Dr. Burke with respect to the medical 
issues involved in Nielson's case. (R. at 378-379.) Dr. Hess 
reviewed the entire Commission Record, including all medical 
records and transcript of hearing before the Commission. 
Dr. Hess spent approximately seven and a half hours reviewing 
the Record and spent additional time preparing an extensive 
abstract of the contents of that Record. Dr. Hess also spent 
time consulting other specialists on the subject medical 
issues. By contrast, Dr. Burke admitted that his entire 
understanding of the case came from a review of the medical 
panel report and the letter of Dr. Harry Bohlman to Dr. Hess 
dated September 4, 1985. (R. at 272-273.) Dr. Burke admitted 
that he had not reviewed the transcript of hearing (R. at 239) 
and that he had not obtained and reviewed the medical records, 
which were substantial (R. at 240 and 246). Indeed Dr. Burke's 
preparation of an opinion was described as spending about an 
hour in reviewing his files, an hour of reviewing literature, 
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and a couple of hours reviewing the medical panel report and 
formulating his thoughts about the case (R. at 240). Dr. Burke 
also admitted that he had not consulted with any other doctor 
concerning this case except to talk to Dr. Hess on the tele-
phone (R. at 240). Dr. Burke did not talk to either Dr. Moress 
or Dr. Bench, the other members of the medical panel, nor did 
he consult with Dr. Bohlman, Dr. Eismont or Dr. Dunn, who pro-
vided input into the analysis of the medical panel. Surpris-
ingly Nielson contends that the Panel lacked sufficient exper-
tise to make a determination in this case, yet Nielson's expert 
relied upon the panel's medical summary as his principal source 
of information to form an opinion. (R. at 240.) Moreover, 
Nielson fails to even address the qualifications of two panel 
members. 
On the other hand, the medical panel not only reviewed the 
entire record in depth and consulted with each other on several 
occasions, but the panel diligently pursued input from experts 
who had specifically studied and written about the medical 
issues presented in Nielson's case. Dr. Hess wrote to and 
received replies from Drs. Eismont and Bohlman who had prepared 
case studies on the medical problems presented herein. (R. at 
123-124, 346, 349-350 and 351.) Dr. Hess also sent the record 
in this case to Dr. Harold K. Dunn whom he characterized as one 
of the finest spine surgeons in the world (R. at 192) for 
Dr. Dunn's independent input. It is also significant that the 
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medical panel had the benefit of Dr. Burke's contrary opinion 
and analysis (R. at 193). Thus, in a real sense, the medical 
panel had the benefit of consultation with a "board certified" 
doctor in infectious diseases in connection with its study. 
Thus, the medical panel was not only fully informed of the facts 
of this case but it had the benefit of the expertise, not only 
of its own panel members but also that of a variety of other 
doctors with diverse backgrounds, experience and specialties, 
including infectious disease. 
It should also not go unnoticed that the medical panel was 
totally independent, unbiased and objective (R. at 200). Its 
members were selected by the Administrative Law Judge, not one 
of the parties to this action, and the panel has considerable 
experience in dealing with medical panel issues. By contrast, 
Dr. Burke is not independent. His original involvement was a 
meeting with Nielson's attorney (R. at 235), and he was hired 
to testify on behalf of Nielson and was paid by him for that 
purpose (R. at 237). Nielson complains concerning the substan-
tial investment which he had to make in expert witness fees in 
order to produce the medical testimony which is contrary to that 
of the medical panel. (Nielson Brief at 17.) This contention 
only serves to emphasize the non-objectivity of Nielson's own 
medical evidence. 
Significantly, Nielson has failed to prove that all panel 
members, as a whole, lacked the requisite expertise demanded by 
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the statute. This Court should not engage in pre-judging what 
specific expertise is necessary to render the medical opinion 
assistance which the Industrial Commission seeks by use of the 
discretionary medical panel. Such judgment should be left up 
to the Industrial Commission who deals with these matters on a 
routine basis. To reverse this case would place the Court of 
Appeals in a position of second-guessing the Commission with 
respect to the medical qualifications of each doctor on each 
specific type of case for each medical issue. 
In summary, the factual determination of the independent 
medical panel relative to causation was the ultimate whole 
opinion of the medical panel members. Nielson attempts in his 
analysis of the medical evidence to separate out individual 
items and force an acceptance by this Court of each separate 
factor rather than to allow reliance by this Court and the 
Administrative Law Judge on the final conclusion based upon all 
of the evidence. Such contentions and their practical conse-
quences are clearly not countenanced by the body of legal 
authority mandating judicial deference to the decisions of the 
agency responsible for managing workers' compensation issues. 
See Rushton v. Galeo Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986). 
B. The Industrial Commission Properly Concluded that 
Nielson's Current Disability Did Not Result from Any 
Industrial Accident. 
It is evident that the medical panel based its opinion on a 
far more sound analysis than did Nielson's expert witness, 
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Dr. Burke. The particular type of infection which invaded 
Nielson's vertebrae and disc could not be identified since post-
surgical cultures were negative. (R. at 357.) It is likewise 
clear that Nielson suffered from and had been treated for 
various other infections in the latter months of 1982. (R. at 
357.) The infections were other possible sources of the infec-
tion which could have migrated to Nielson's spine (R. at 
160-164.) 
Nielson had a fairly chronic bronchitis beginning in 
August, 1982 for which he was treated on various occasions with 
antibiotics through the month of December. Id. In addition, 
Applicant suffered from an infected toe in September, 1982. 
Id. He also had gastrointestinal problems which could have 
involved an infectious disease process. _Id. It was noted by 
Dr. Hess that all of these later infections were in closer 
proximity to the onset of pain in Nielson's neck which did not 
commence until 10 months after the industrial accident (R. at 
195). Dr. Hess testified and Dr. Burke conceded, that the time 
lapse between the onset of symptoms which reflect an invasion 
of the disease process to the vertebrae and disc area in the 
spine and the ability to detect such condition by way of x-ray, 
etc., is only a matter of about three weeks (R. at 166-168, and 
219). Thus it is reasonable, as concluded by the medical 
panel, that the source of infection which ultimately resulted 
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in Nielson1s osteomyelitis/discitis would more likely be some 
infectious ailment experienced by Nielson in late 1982, not the 
industrial accident which Applicant sustained in April 1982, 
more than 10 months before the onset of any symptoms and 
approximately 14 months prior to the diagnosis of his condi-
tion. By contrast, Dr. Burke attempted to discount and there-
fore ignore the other possible sources of infection. Moreover, 
he appeared to totally ignore the fact that Nielson had been 
placed on antibiotic medication during 1982 which would have 
eliminated latent sources of infection which may have come from 
the industrial accident. 
Importantly, Dr. Burke testified that in his opinion the 
osteomyelitis found in Nielson's cervical spine was the result 
of a blood-born infection (R. at 210). He then went on to 
explain that "blood born infections are not common in disc 
spaces" (R. at 212). Dr. Burke then revealed that infectious 
organisms are commonly present in the blood of healthy indi-
viduals (R. at 213). These facts compel one to conclude that 
an attempt to formulate a causal connection between Applicant's 
osteomyelitis/discitis and the industrial accident is highly 
speculative. 
Dr. Burke conceded that apparently the source of infection 
could well have been that which was carried in the blood of 
Applicant as a normal healthy individual, in addition to those 
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generated by the known infections suffered by Nielson between 
the time he suffered an industrial accident and the condition 
of which Nielson now complains. Even based upon the reasoning 
provided by Dr. Burke, one must conclude that his opinions were 
not based upon reasonable medical probability. In fact, in his 
letter to Nielson's attorney, Dr. Burke agreed with Dr. Bohlman 
that there is no way one can "prove a connection" between the 
accident and the disc infection that long after the injury. 
(R. at 130, 349-350.) Accordingly, the Commission upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge's factual determination that the source 
of infection resulting in Nielson's osteomyelitis/discitis 
simply cannot be determined to be causally related to the indus-
trial accident: 
[T]here were certainly other notable possible sources 
of infection. There is nothing but a possibility that 
the osteomyelitis arose from a staph infection. In 
addition, any of the infections which arose subsequent 
to the accident (although not cultured), could have 
contained staph as well. 
Finally, the overwhelming weight of medical opinion con-
tained in the Record in this case favors the position taken by 
the medical panel which was adopted by the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Commission. The medical panel determination was 
not only the unanimous decision of Drs. Hess, Moress, and Bench 
(R. at 183) but it was also the opinion of Drs. Eismont and 
Bohlman to whom Dr. Hess had referred this matter for comment 
and it was also specifically confirmed by the opinion of 
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Dr. Dunn to whom the medical panel had referred its file for 
complete review. (R. at 123-124, 346, 349-351.) It is also 
instructive to note that Dr. Robert Lamb, the orthopedic surgeon 
who performed Nielson's surgery in June of 1983 concluded that 
he could not relate Nielson's difficulties to his job (R. at 
188). Thus, six independent doctors plus Nielson's treating 
physician, Dr. Lamb, all support the factual determination made 
by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission. 
Nielson cannot claim that he has not been given every oppor-
tunity to address the medical issues in this case fully and 
without prejudice. In fact, the medical expertise afforded to 
Nielson through the appointment and activities of the medical 
panel are overwhelming in comparison to other cases. In this 
case the Administrative Law Judge appointed three panel members, 
rather than just one. The three panel members alleged to lack 
sufficient expertise possessed treatment expertise in ortho-
pedics, neurology and internal medicine, and all three are 
shown by the Record to have expertise in infectious disease as 
related to Nielson's particular type of problem, a conclusion 
with which Dr. Burke agrees. (R. at 242, and 408-410.) 
Nielson suggests that he was not given an opportunity to 
cross-examine panel members other than Dr. Hess. (Nielson's 
Brief at 17-18). As the record amply demonstrates, all three 
panel members attended the hearing on Nielson's Objections to 
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the Medical Panel Report. (R. at 149.) However, Nielson chose 
not to cross-examine either Dr. Moress or Dr. Bench. Nielson 
can hardly call in question their expertise under these 
circumstances. 
There is no evidence contained in the Record of this case 
which would even remotely demonstrate that the Administrative 
Law Judge acted capriciously, arbitrarily or in excess of her 
powers as claimed by Nielson. Equally unsubstantiated is 
Nielson's contention that the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are unsupported by evi-
dence. The evidence supporting the Administrative Law Judge's 
Findings and Conclusions is well documented in the medical 
panel report, the supporting letters of Drs. Eismont, Bohlman, 
and Dunn; the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Lamb; and 
the testimony provided by Dr. Hess at the Commission's hearing 
on Nielson's objections to the Medical Panel Report. Likewise, 
the bold assertion by Nielson that the judge's delay in decision 
somehow caused the judge to improperly analyze the evidence is 
wholly without foundation. If anything, the Record demonstrates 
that the Administrative Law Judge was extremely magnanimous 
toward Nielson in that her decision was based upon a long, 
thoughtful and meticulous analysis of the evidence. Moreover, 
she chose a medical panel who is not only independent but has 
broad expertise and experience relating to the particular 
medical questions to be addressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Record demonstrates that the overwhelming weight of 
evidence supports the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Final Order of the 
Commission on the essential issues in this case. It is 
unnecessary and contrary to the applicable standard of review 
for this court to attempt to second-guess the judgment of the 
Administrative Law Judge, the Medical Panel and the full 
Commission on the factual issues which only involve the weight 
of the evidence herein. This is especially true where the 
weight of the evidence clearly favors the determination made in 
favor of Respondents. Based on the foregoing, Respondents 
respectfully request that this Court affirm the determination 
of the Industrial Commission, denying Nielson's Motion for 
Review. 
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